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# CIA lost influence on Soviet issues

• Second of two articles.

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WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has lost much of its pre-eminence in influencing national security decisions on Soviet matters, according to CIA and other intelligence sources.

Despite substantial growth in personnel and resources under the Reagan administration, the agency has become the victim of entrenched ideology within the National Security Council, the administration's foreign-policy arm, and military intelligence agencies have taken up the slack, the sources said.

"It's awfully difficult to tell Richard Pipes something he doesn't want to hear," one CIA analyst complained. Pipes, who recently resigned from the NSC, is widely known for his tough anti-Russian posture.

The sources attributed much of the emerging influence of military intelligence agencies, especially the Defense Intelligence Agency and Air Force intelligence, to their hard-line reporting of the Soviet threat.

The leading casualty of administration snub within the CIA has been the so-called Soviet Shop, the largest subdivision within the agency. It has several hundred analysts who pore over thousands of documents, field reports and other intelligence flowing from Russia and Eastern Europe and assess the data for policymakers.

One intelligence source who has direct knowledge of the interplay between the Soviet Shop and the administration's na-

tional security advisers attributes the distrust by the administration to a belief that "the CIA has consistently promulgated a very benign view of Soviet policies and Soviet aggressiveness."

One analyst who has briefed policymakers in both the Carter and Reagan administrations described the differences this way: "Under Carter there was a lot more interchange, more interaction on analyses. The Reagan National Security Council is much more ideological. There is much more proclivity now to already know the answers."

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, agrees. "Our NSC staff was more inclined to encourage analysis, to react to it, and therefore help the CIA develop it further," he said in an interview.

Recent evidence of the diminished role of the CIA's analytical function in Soviet affairs was the NSC's rejection of the CIA's conclusion that the administration's resistance to the Soviet natural gas pipeline was a flawed policy. Because the NSC receives much of the same cable traffic as the CIA, it drew its own conclusions — and rejected the CIA's findings.

Only after Secretary of State George Shultz joined the administration last summer was the policy modified.

Signs that changes were in the wind emerged even before the administration settled into the White House. One of the aides in the CIA transition team, Angelo Codevilla, now on the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, urged

the dismissal of all members of the Soviet Shop management, although he was overruled by the transition team's director, Edward Rowney, now the administration's chief arms control negotiator.

Still, the Soviet Shop was uprooted and transferred en masse to a new facility in nearby Vienna, Va., a relocation that removed them from classified files, from other CIA staffers and from the agency's nerve center. A number of analysts resigned and, according to a knowledgeable source, "the analytical output declined."

To be sure, the CIA blundered in some estimates of Soviet military buildup. But in many areas, such as predicting when the Soviets would come out with MIRVs, or multiple warheads, the CIA was closer to target than military intelligence.

Yet the defense intelligence agencies, according to several sources, are clearly in favor inside the administration. The predisposition was there from the moment the administration came in in 1981.

The dominant service intelligence unit is Air Force Intelligence, the sources said. "Air Force Intelligence, because (the Air Force) has got most of the strategic weapons, gets to do a lot of the glamour stuff on the Soviet Strategic threat," an analyst said. "It's got a lot of hard-chargers in the intelligence management."

Another CIA analyst said the Air Force had "achieved pre-eminence (within the administration) because they tend to be harder-line boys."

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